Lessons Learned from Dependency Usage in HERA: Implications for THERP-Related HRA Methods by Whaley, April M. et al.
This is a preprint of a paper intended for publication in a journal or 
proceedings. Since changes may be made before publication, this 
preprint should not be cited or reproduced without permission of the 
author. This document was prepared as an account of work 
sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither 
the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of 
their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or 
assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party’s use, 
or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or 
process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such 
third party would not infringe privately owned rights. The views 
expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the United 
States Government or the sponsoring agency. 
INL/CON-07-12863
PREPRINT
Lessons Learned from 
Dependency Usage in 
HERA:  Implications for 
THERP-Related HRA 
Methods
Joint 8th Annual Conference on Human Factors 
and Power Plants and the 13th Annual Workshop 
on Human Performance / Root Cause / Trending / 
Operating Experience / and Self Assessment 
(HPRCT)
April M. Whaley 
Ronald L. Boring 
Harold S. Blackman 
Patrick H. McCabe 
Bruce P. Hallbert 
August 2007 
Lessons Learned from Dependency Usage in HERA:
Implications for THERP-Related HRA Methods
April M. Whaley, Ronald L. Boring, Harold S. Blackman, Patrick H. McCabe, Bruce P. Hallbert
1
Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, Idaho, USA
{april.whaley,ronald.boring,harold.blackman,patrick.mccabe,bruce.hallbert}@inl.gov
Abstract—Dependency occurs when the probability of success or
failure on one action changes the probability of success or failure
on a subsequent action. Dependency may serve as a modifier on
the human error probabilities (HEPs) for successive actions in
human reliability analysis (HRA) models. Discretion should be
employed when determining whether or not a dependency
calculation is warranted: dependency should not be assigned
without strongly grounded reasons. Human reliability analysts
may sometimes assign dependency in cases where it is
unwarranted. This inappropriate assignment is attributed to a
lack of clear guidance to encompass the range of scenarios human
reliability analysts are addressing. Inappropriate assignment of
dependency produces inappropriately elevated HEP values.
Lessons learned about dependency usage in the Human Event
Repository and Analysis (HERA) system may provide
clarification and guidance for analysts using THERP-based
dependency models. This paper presents the HERA approach to
dependency assessment and discusses considerations for
dependency usage in HRA, including the cognitive basis for
dependency, direction for determining when dependency should
be assessed, considerations for determining the dependency level,
temporal issues to consider when assessing dependency, (e.g.,
considering task sequence versus overall event sequence, and
dependency over long periods of time), and diagnosis and action
influences on dependency.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) system
[1] is a tool developed to analyze and classify human
performance information from nuclear power plant operating
experience (e.g., event reports). The HERA system was
specifically designed to be of a content and form useful to a
variety of human reliability analysis (HRA) methods and the
general discipline of human factors. As such, it consists of an
analysis method that identifies information of interest to HRA,
such as unsafe human actions, successful human actions
including recoveries, performance shaping factors that
contribute to human performance, and dependency between
unsafe human actions.
A. Dependency Assessment in HRA
Dependency occurs when the probability of success or failure
on one action changes the probability of success or failure on a
subsequent action. The process of assessing dependency and
incorporating dependency into the final human error probability
(HEP) estimate varies by method. There is a wide variety of
HRA methods available for use today; some explicitly model
dependency, some assess dependency as part of the larger
context surrounding human performance, and others do not
consider dependency at all. The dependency model used in the
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [2] HRA
method is widely used on its own and serves as the foundation
for dependency modeling in other widely used methods such as
SPAR-H [3] and ASEP [4].
Chapter 10 of THERP [2] provides an extensive discussion of
dependency, including defining dependency levels ranging from
zero dependence to complete dependence. The THERP process
breaks down tasks into subtasks through task analysis, and
provides explicit instructions for assessing dependencies among
subtasks. It does not, however, provide guidance for
considering dependency between different tasks. The subtask
dependency model is often used to address dependency between
tasks in THERP, which may not always be appropriate.
NUREG-1792, Good Practices for Implementing Human
Reliability Analysis (HRA) [5], emphasizes examining human
performance throughout the entire accident sequence for
commonalities, similarities, and links among the actions, such
as when involving the same crew members, occurring closely in
time, sharing a common mindset, etc. In other words, the Good
Practices document advocates considering the context of the
actions in question when assessing dependency. The THERP
dependency model only accounts for a small set of factors when
calculating dependency, and therefore would not fully conform
to the guidance established for dependency assessment in the
Good Practices document. Because THERP does not fully
consider context, using the THERP model of dependency may
result in unrealistic HEP values.
Inappropriate dependency assignment may be attributed to a
lack of clear guidance to encompass the range of scenarios
human reliability analysts are addressing. Additionally,
guidance regarding issues such as how to determine when
dependency should be assessed, how to determine the factors or
mechanisms that lead to dependency and how to consider those
factors when assigning the dependency level, and how to
properly consider temporal issues when assessing dependency is
insufficient or absent [6]. Lessons learned about dependency
usage in developing the HERA system and analyzing events
within the HERA system may provide clarification and
guidance about these issues.
II. HERA GUIDANCE ON DEPENDENCY ISSUES IN HRA
A. The HERA Approach to Dependency
The HERA approach to dependency is based in part on the
Good Practices in HRA document [5], but it differs slightly
from the standard processes used in individual HRA methods,
as it was designed to be informative to HRA in general,
regardless of the specific method being employed. As HERA
was being developed, it became clear that the approach to
dependency offered by the many HRA methods was not
appropriate for the data used in HERA. The information
available in event reports does not lend itself easily to
dependency calculation. In many cases, event reports offer a
high-level overview of risk-significant activities that may omit
risk-insignificant steps or contributors to the event sequence,
therefore offering an account that may obscure any
dependencies between human actions. Therefore, the HERA
dependency assessment process was modified from traditional
HRA dependency assessment to better suit the data being
analyzed.
The HERA analysis process breaks down an event report into
a timeline of subevents, individual human and equipment
operations, and actions that contribute to an overall event. A
human action that potentially decreases the safety of the event,
such as an error, is classified as an “XHE” in HERA. The
definition of dependency used in HERA is, “dependency exists
between two subevents when an error on one subevent increases
the probability that an error will occur on a subsequent
subevent” [7].
HERA recognizes that dependency can exist between
successful human actions and errors. However, because most
HRA methods do not currently model the relationship between
human errors and successful human actions, dependency is only
completed for potentially unsafe human subevents, or XHEs.
The approach to dependency assessment adopted in HERA does
not attempt to quantify the level of dependency, nor does it limit
the parameters that need apply. Instead, HERA analysts
determine if dependency exists between two subevents and then
identify the source of dependency (i.e., explain what
dependence mechanisms were involved).
B. Determining Whether Dependency Should Be Assessed
The first step an analyst should take when considering
dependency between human actions is to determine whether a
dependency calculation is warranted. In practice, however, it is
common for analysts performing an HRA to automatically
perform a calculation of dependency level without first
questioning whether dependency is actually present between the
actions under consideration. The HERA analysis process
instructs analysts to first consider whether there is any reason
for dependency to occur between human actions.
The HERA authors believe that dependency between human
actions is largely based in human cognition: dependency
between human actions arises from the knowledge or lack of
knowledge of the person involved in the second task regarding
the occurrence and/or effect of the previous task. If an operator
has no knowledge of a prior task, then it is not possible for that
task to affect performance of a subsequent task.
1
More clearly
stated, dependency arises from mindset. Mental models are
updated by experience, so prior actions and errors can act as
current cues and create expectancies and predispositions to
behave in a certain manner. In other words, previous actions or
experiences create a mindset that directs decision making [3].
The HERA dependency assessment process considers the
multitude of situational, contextual, organizational, cognitive,
and personal factors that can affect task dependency. HERA
instructs analysts to ask the following questions to help them
make an appropriate decision as to whether dependency exists
between two human actions:
• Do the actions under consideration involve similar
tasks?
• Are they part of a related sequence of actions?
• Do the personnel involved in each task share
knowledge or a mindset that guides their actions?
• Is there any reason to expect that the first action
influences the second?
If several subevents are all influenced by the same
performance shaping factor (PSF), such as poor work processes,
for example, it does not necessarily mean there is a dependency
between them. If the PSF increases the likelihood of
subsequent errors, then dependency exists. In other words,
HERA asks analysts to fully consider the context of the actions
under analysis and determine whether the situation is producing
dependency between human actions.
In the case where multiple errors are made due to the same
PSF but are otherwise unrelated to each other, HERA considers
this to be a case of shared PSFs, not dependency, and identifies
this information in the PSF assignment sections, not in the
dependency section. HRA analysts also should consider these
issues in the context of the method they are using before making
a dependency calculation. An obvious example is that
dependency is unlikely to occur between human actions that are
a part of separate functions on an event tree, because the actions
are unrelated to each other. Generally speaking, if there is no
reason to predict that an error on one task or action makes a
subsequent error more likely, then dependency does not exist
between the two actions.
C. Determining Dependency Level: Dependency Factors
The traditional THERP [2] approach to dependency
assessment uses several parameters to determine the level of
dependency between subevents, including same or different
crew, time, location, and cues. With these parameters came a
scale that rated dependency from zero (no dependency) to a
value representing complete dependency (see Table I).
Following these criteria too rigidly, however, may lead to
assignments of dependency levels that do not make sense given
the situation under analysis, or are otherwise inappropriate. For
example, not considering the possibility of zero dependency,
even when all dependency factors do not apply, could
1 The exception to this informal rule comes in cases when the operator should
have been cognizant of a required action but failed to perform it. Such an error
of omission may propagate itself, as the operator may continue not to realize
the error, subsequently hindering successful recovery actions.
erroneously result in the assignment of low dependency using
the guidance in Table I.
TABLE I. DEPENDENCY ASSIGNMENT FROM SPAR-H BASED ON
THERP.
Dependency
Level
Same
Crew
Close in
Time
Same
Location
No
Additional
Cues
Dependency
Modification
   Complete
  
HEP = 1
  
 
High
  
1+HEP
2
 
 
  
 
 
Moderate

1+6xHEP
7

 


Low 1+19xHEP
20
Zero HEP
HERA does not quantify the level of dependency, nor does it
limit the parameters that can produce dependency. Instead,
HERA analysts consider the context surrounding the subevents
in question, determine whether dependency exists between two
human actions and then explain the factors or mechanisms that
led to the dependency (i.e., describe the context). HERA
recognizes the THERP factors listed above (crew, time,
location, and cues) as mechanisms for dependency, but these are
only a subset of a much larger set of potential dependency
mechanisms or contextual factors that can lead to dependency
as well. A list of some possible contextual dependency factors
that are included in HERA is presented in Table II below. Note
that these mechanisms overlap one another and should not be
considered orthogonal. Also note that this list is not exhaustive;
HERA analysts are instructed to carefully consider any factor
that reasonably triggers an increased likelihood of a negative
outcome across subevents as a candidate dependency
mechanism. It is important for HRA analysts to be aware that
the factors presented in HRA methods as criteria for
determining the dependency level are not absolute rules. Two
actions can occur closely in time, be in the same location, and
involve the same personnel, but be independent because the
actions are part of unrelated tasks or functions. Similarly,
moderate dependency can exist between two actions despite
involving different personnel across a long period of time.
Currently the HERA system is designed primarily for
retrospective analyses. Analysts performing a prospective HRA
have to predict the most likely contributing factors and whether
dependency is at play. Often, HRA analysts will set a high
level of dependency as a screening value to determine the
strongest possible or worst case effect of dependency on the
total HEP. Our advice to HRA analysts performing prospective
analyses is similar to that for retrospective analyses: analysts
should carefully consider the situation under review, the tasks
involved, the possible mechanisms for dependency, and the
THERP definitions of the dependency levels, and then decide
whether a dependency calculation is warranted and which level
of dependency is most appropriate for the situation.
D. Proper Consideration of Temporal Sequence
HERA recognizes that dependency can occur between human
actions that are not contiguous in time. It is possible for series
of parallel activities to occur during an event. In such a case,
the dependencies should reflect the proper track of occurrence,
even when actions from different tracks co-mingle
chronologically. HERA analysts consider dependency among
subevents within tasks, rather than between subevents that are
adjacent in the chronological order but are a part of separate
tasks. For example, in Fig. 1 below, XHE 1 and XHE 3 are part
of the same task sequence, and it is possible for XHE 3 to be
dependent on XHE 1. XHE 2, however, represents a parallel
activity that is unrelated to the task sequence including XHE 1
and XHE 3. Dependency occurs only between XHE 1 and XHE
3, even though XHE 2 occurs between them chronologically.
Figure 1. Task sequence vs. chronological sequence.
In order to properly consider possible dependencies between
all XHEs, HERA analysts use the dependency matrix when
determining whether dependency exists between two XHEs (see
Fig. 2). Each XHE in the event under analysis is listed across
the top row and down the left column, in chronological order.
This allows HERA analysts to indicate whether dependency
exists between the first XHE (listed in the column) and the
second, the third, and so on (listed in the top row), by checking
the box that intersects the two subevents. Using the list of
possible dependency mechanisms (see Table II) as a guide, the
HERA analyst moves to the second row and indicates any
dependency between the second XHE and the third, the fourth,
and so on, continuing down the rows until all subevents are
accounted for.
Figure 2. The HERA Dependency Matrix.
XHE 3XHE 1
XHE 2
time
TABLE II. SELECTED HERA DEPENDENCE MECHANISMS
Dependence
Mechanism
Discussion
Task Task refers to the goal-driven activity performed by the crew. Each task represents different activities and corresponding different goals
necessary to complete an action. A task may roughly correspond to a step of a procedure or may be defined at a finer grain corresponding to
a series of actions required by each procedural step. If the second subevent involves a different task than the first, then dependency is very
unlikely. If the two subevents involve the same or closely related tasks, however, dependency is possible. If, for example, an operator
misreads a procedure step that causes him or her to go to the wrong subsequent procedure step, both actions share a common task of
following procedures and could be considered dependent.
Crew / Person Crew is broadly defined as those personnel who individually or as a team carry out plant activities. If the crew (or operator) involved in the
first subevent is the same as is involved in the second subevent, there is a greater chance that dependency can exist between the subevents.
This dependency may be related to the sub-optimal performance by a particular crew carrying forward to subsequent tasks. However, even if
there is a different person or crew, if the culture or mindset is the same at the second subevent as the first, dependency is possible. Such
would be the case for management sanctioned workarounds, in which two different crews have an established pattern of activity that does not
differ between them and results in an undetected unsafe plant state. See also “Organizational/Team Culture” and “Mindset” below.
Time If two subevents occur closely together in time, there is a greater possibility for dependency, as there is less opportunity for other factors
(such as a different person or different cues) to intervene between the two subevents. When two subevents are close in time, there is less
opportunity for recovery, as the ramifications of an error may not yet be apparent and there is inadequate time to recognize the problem.
However, it is possible for dependency to exist between subevents that are far apart in time, even years, if other dependency mechanisms are
at play, such as culture or mindset. Maintenance issues are examples of subevents that may span a large time but still be dependent.
Location The location of a series of crew activities is an important consideration for dependency. If the second subevent takes place in the same
location as the first subevent, there is a greater possibility for dependency between the two subevents. Proximate activities do not afford
additional context that may enable the crew to diagnose and recover from an error.
Cues Additional cues such as instrument readings, feedback from other personnel, or system performance introduce new information that thwarts
the escalation of an error between two subevents. If additional cues are present during the second subevent in the sequence, dependency
between subevents is less likely. If, however, no additional cues are available, then there is a greater possibility for dependency to exist
between the subevents. The crew lacks additional information that may enable it to diagnose and recover from an error.
Independent
oversight
Independent oversight refers to the presence of personnel in addition to the crew involved in completing plant tasks. Independent oversight
can prevent dependency between subevents, often by providing additional cues. If a second checker is not truly independent (e.g., shares the
same mindset as the operator), or if no second checker is involved, there is a greater likelihood that a negative outcome will go unmitigated
and will have trickle-down negative effects on subsequent subevents. For example, a senior reactor operator’s failure to notice a crew’s
faulty control setting can result in an unexpected plant transient and later difficulty determining the cause of that transient by the crew.
Organizational/
Team Culture
Organizational or team culture refers to the general worker attitudes and interactions that pervade activities at the plant. Culture is generally
seen as a performance shaping factor (assessed in HERA through the Work Processes PSF), but it can be a mechanism for dependency, even
over long periods of time. If the person or crew involved in a second subevent in sequence is operating under the same culture as the person
or crew involved with the first subevent, then dependency is possible. Such would be the case for management sanctioned workarounds, in
which two different crews have an established pattern of activity that does not differ between them and results in an undetected unsafe plant
state. See also “Crew/Person” above and “Mindset” below. Organizational culture may also refer to factors such as the communication style
of the crew. For example, a questioning crew may be more likely to detect a problem and hinder its progression than a crew that fears
reprisal for questioning the course of actions during plant operation.
Mindset Mindset refers to the attitudes toward aspects of plant operations, from attitudes toward safety to established patterns for performing
activities in a specific fashion. It also refers to an understanding of the nature, cause, and consequences of a situation and the proper actions
to take in response to the situation. Even if the person or crew involved in the second subevent is different from the person or crew involved
in the first subevent, if the mindset is the same at both points, then dependency is possible between the two subevents. Such would be the
case for a shared misunderstanding, for example, that certain degraded conditions are considered normal, and different crews have an
established pattern of activity based on that misunderstanding that does not differ between them and results in an undetected unsafe plant
state. A fresh perspective, be it from the same or a different person, can prevent the triggering of subsequent errors across subevents.
Work Practices One way to look at work practices is in terms of safety culture. Work practices that strongly uphold safety are likely to have the necessary
questioning mindset, second checking, and emphasis on individual safety to prevent human errors and, more importantly, detect and correct
them before they escalate. Thus, safe work practices would tend to decrease the incidence of dependency between two subevents. Like
Culture, Work Practices are usually seen as a PSF, and are assessed in HERA through the Work Processes PSF. It is also possible for work
practices to be a mechanism for dependency. If the same poor work practices influence more than one subevent in a sequence and make a
second error more likely, then dependence due to work practices exists. If, however, the work practices involved in the second subevent are
different than the first action, dependency is less likely.
Intervening
successes
Intervening successes or recovery can stop the escalation of negative subevents, often by introducing new cues or changing the crew mindset
in a way that allows the crew to correct its course of action. A lack of intervening successes, on the other hand, can make dependency
between subevents more likely. It is important to recognize that intervening successes do not necessarily prevent dependency between
subevents, particularly if the success is unrelated to the subevent sequence in question.
Equipment /
System
Equipment or system refers to those devices used by the crew to detect and control plant operations. It is important to recognize that the
equipment or system is not synonymous with Location. Systems can be large and spread out over large areas, and equipment can, in some
cases, be moved. If the equipment or system has an underlying characteristic (e.g., a stuck control valve) that causes the operators to perform
a series of tasks incorrectly, then there is dependency between those tasks.
Unreliable
system feedback
Unreliable system feedback (e.g., a misleading indicator or failed instrumentation) can contribute to dependency between actions in a task
sequence by not allowing personnel to detect important underlying plant states or by leading personnel to a particular mindset (e.g., “do not
trust the indicators”). Those faulty actions in response to the unreliable system feedback are dependent.
Action prompts
next incorrect
action
It is often the case that one error (often in judgment or diagnosis) leads the involved personnel down an incorrect path of action. In this case,
dependency between actions in that path is very likely, as one error leads to subsequent errors. Additional cues or new personnel or mindset
can break the path in such a situation.
Human reliability analysts often work from an event tree, in
which case they are considering human actions within a task
sequence. However, analysts typically only consider
dependency between successive actions in a sequence (e.g.,
between XHE 1 and XHE 2, between XHE 2 and XHE 3, etc.).
HERA allows consideration of dependency between XHE 1 and
XHE 4, something that it not routinely performed in HRA
currently (see Fig. 3). Whether working from an event tree or
not, HRA analysts should be aware of the need to work within
task sequences and to identify possible dependencies between
human actions that they would not normally consider.
Figure 3. Dependency throughout an action sequence
Dependencies over very long timeframes are generally not
addressed by current HRA methods. However, multiple HERA
analyses have identified dependencies between subevents that
occurred years apart. Such cases have often been due to
instances of a shared organizational culture or mindset that led
to increased unsafe actions across time. Latent errors—those
that do not have an immediate impact but may affect system
safety at a later time—almost invariably feature some degree of
dependency over a long timeframe. The HERA approach to
dependency allows analysts to identify and describe such cases
of dependency over long periods of time. HRA analysts should
remain aware of the possibility of dependency over long
timeframes, and include such calculations in their analyses as
appropriate.
E. Implications of Diagnosis and Action for Dependency
Assessment
Some HRA methods such as SPAR-H [3] weight PSFs
differently depending on whether the subevent under analysis
involves diagnosis (a cognitive task such as decision making) or
action (a behavioral response such as activating a switch), but
there is little guidance available on how to properly consider
diagnosis and action tasks when assessing dependency. Further
research is needed to determine exactly how diagnosis and
action tasks influence dependency. Insights gained from the
HERA system may provide some clarification and serve to
generate future exploration of this issue. The following
argument is presented as a topic for further discussion.
HERA describes these four steps of human information
processing or decision making [7]:
• Detection or recognition of a condition or change in
situation (e.g., a problem or alarm)
• Interpretation of the condition or change in situation
• Planning a response to the situation
• Executing the response (action)
Diagnosis consists of the first three steps. Errors can occur at
any of these steps and at more than one step in the sequence. In
HERA, it is possible to see an XHE represent all of these steps,
or for several XHEs to occur within one sequence.
One of the dependency mechanisms listed in Table II above
is “Action prompts next incorrect action.” This refers to the
case where an error early on in the human information
processing steps leads personnel down an incorrect path of
actions. If an error is made in interpretation of the situation,
subsequent planning and actions are more likely to be
inappropriate; they are more likely to be dependent upon that
error in interpretation. On the other hand, if the first error is an
error in action implementation, any subsequent errors or unsafe
actions are more likely to be unrelated to the first error. Recall
the discussion above about dependency arising from mindset.
The diagnosis steps of this process establish the mindset, and
then the action follows. If the diagnosis is correct but an error
occurs in response implementation, operators are likely to
recognize the error and take actions to correct it. If however,
the error is in diagnosis, actions taken as a result of the incorrect
mindset are less likely to be recognized as inappropriate.
The HERA authors propose that when two actions under
consideration for dependency are a part of the same detection-
interpretation-planning-response sequence, then dependency is
likely. If the two actions are part of separate, unrelated
cognitive sequences, dependency is not likely. In many ways,
this is similar or parallel to the THERP approach of considering
dependency between subtasks within a task. Within the steps of
the human information processing, or within a task, dependency
is more likely than between separate cognitive sequences or
tasks, respectively. The information processing process is
something that is repeated iteratively. It is possible for two
actions to be part of separate cognitive sequences that are
related in a larger series of human actions. In such a case,
dependency between the two actions is possible.
F. Dependency and HEP Calculations
Some HRA methods such as SPAR-H [3] provide explicit
instructions on how to calculate dependency levels and include
dependency in the HEP calculation. Other HRA methods leave
assessing a dependency level and incorporating dependency
calculation into the HEP estimate to analyst discretion [6].
HERA does not assign dependency levels, as discussed above,
nor does it generate HEP values. For HRA methods that assign
a dependency level, the HERA authors recommend that HRA
analysts review the descriptions of the dependency levels
provided in THERP [2], consider the factors and processes
included in the HRA method being employed, consider the
additional dependency mechanisms discussed in HERA, and
consider the full context of the actions in question when
assigning a dependency level. Our advice is similar for
determining how to incorporate dependency into the overall
HEP value: HRA analysts should give full consideration to the
context of the actions under analysis within the process of the
method being employed. Such a careful approach will enable
analysts to avoid overestimating or underestimating the
dependency level between two human actions.
XHE 3XHE 1
XHE 2
time
XHE 4
III. DISCUSSION
THERP-based dependency models lack consideration of
some key contextual factors that are importance in today’s HRA
modeling. Yet they are still widely used. Issues relating to
insufficient guidance regarding dependency assessment may
result in inconsistent and/or inappropriate HEP values. Insights
gained from the HERA system and approach to dependency
provide additional clarification and guidance for dependency
assessment in cases where existing information may not apply,
and by bringing the consideration of context to THERP-based
dependency models, may therefore improve the HRA
dependency assessment process and resultant HEP values.
HERA provides discussion for determining when dependency
should be assessed, information about a variety of factors that
lead to dependency between human actions to aid analysts in
determining the proper dependency level, discussion about
temporal issues that affect dependency calculations, and
guidance for properly considering diagnosis and action when
assessing dependency. Armed with guidance from the HRA
Good Practices [5], and guidance from HERA [7], HRA
analysts will be better prepared to appropriately and accurately
characterize and include dependency in their HEP calculations.
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